We prove that every key exchange protocol in the random oracle model in which the honest users make at most n queries to the oracle can be broken by an adversary making O(n 2 ) queries to the oracle. This improves on the previousΩ(n 6 ) query attack given by Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC '89). Our bound is optimal up to a constant factor since Merkle (CACM '78) gave an n query key exchange protocol in this model that cannot be broken by an adversary making o(n 2 ) queries.
Introduction
In the 1970's Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle began to challenge the accepted wisdom that two parties cannot communicate confidentially over an open channel without first exchanging a secret key using some secure means. The first such protocol (at least in the open scientific community) was designed by Merkle in 1974 (although only published in 1978 ). Merkle's protocol allows two parties Alice and Bob to agree on a random number k that will not be known to an eavesdropping adversary Eve. It is described in Figure 1 .
One problem with Merkle's protocol is that its security was only analyzed in the random oracle model which does not necessarily capture security when instantiated with a cryptographic one-way or hash function [CGH] . 1 But the most serious issue with Merkle's protocol is that it only provides a quadratic gap between the running time of the honest parties and the adversary. Fortunately, not too long after Merkle, Diffie and Hellman [DH] and later Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [RSA] gave constructions for key exchange protocols that are conjectured to have super-polynomial (even subexponential) security. But because these and later protocols are based on certain algebraic computational problems, and so could perhaps be vulnerable to unforseen attacks using this algebraic structure, it remained an important question to show whether there exist key exchange protocols with superpolynomial security that use only a random oracle. 2 The seminal paper of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR] answered this question negatively by showing that every key exchange protocol using n queries in the random oracle model can be broken by an adversary asking O(n 6 log n) queries. 3 
Merkle's Key Exchange Protocol
Let n be the security parameter. All parties have access to oracle to a function H : {0, 1} ℓ → {0, 1} ℓ chosen at random, where ℓ ≫ log n. The protocol operates as follows:
1. Alice chooses 10n random numbers x 1 , . . . , x n in [n 2 ] and sends a 1 , . . . , a n to Bob where a i = H(x i ) (embed [n 2 ] in {0, 1} ℓ in some canonical way).
2. Bob chooses 10n random numbers y 1 , . . . , y n in [n 2 ] and sends b 1 , . . . , b n to Alice where b j = H(x j ).
3. With at least 0.9 probability, there will be at least one "collision" between Alice's and Bob's messages: a pair i, j such that a i = b j . Alice and Bob choose the lexicographically first such pair, and Alice sets s a = x i as her secret, and Bob sets s b = y j as his secret. If no collision occurred they will not choose any secret. Note that assuming 2 ℓ ≫ n 4 , H will be one to one on [n 2 ] with very high probability and hence H(x i ) = H(y j ) implies
To analyze the protocol one shows that the collision is distributed uniformly in [n 2 ] and deduces that an adversary Eve that makes o(n 2 ) queries to the oracle will find the secret with o(1) probability.
Figure 1: Merkle's key exchange protocol. (Merkle described his protocol using "puzzles" that can be implemented via some ideal cryptographic primitive; we describe the protocol in the case that the puzzles are implemented by a random oracle.)
Since a random oracle is in particular a one-way function (with high probability), this implied that there is no construction of a key exchange protocol based on a one-way function with a proof of super-polynomial security that is of the standard black-box type (i.e., a proof that transforms an adversary breaking the protocol into an inversion algorithm for the one-way function that only uses the adversary and the function as black boxes). Indeed, that was the motivation behind their result. Still, Impagliazzo and Rudich left as an open question [IR, Section 8] whether there exist protocols in the random oracle model with ω(n 2 ) security or in fact Merkle's protocol is optimal. One motivation for this question is practical-protocols with sufficiently large polynomial gap could be secure enough in practice (e.g., a key exchange protocol taking 10 9 operations to run and (10 9 ) 6 = 10 54 operations to break could be good enough for many applications), and in fact as technology improves, such polynomial gaps only become more useful. Another motivation is theoretical-since Merkle's protocol has very limited interaction (it consists of one round in which both parties simultaneously broadcast a message) it's natural to ask whether more interaction can help achieve some polynomial advantage over this simple protocol.
In this work we answer the above question, by showing that every protocol in the random oracle model where Alice and Bob make n oracle queries can be broken with high probability by an adversary making O(n 2 ) queries. That is, we prove the following: Theorem 1.1. Let Π be a two-party protocol in the random oracle model such that when executing Π the two parties Alice and Bob make a total of at most n queries, and their outputs are identical with probability at least ρ. Then, there is an adversary Eve making O( n 2 δ 2 ) queries to the oracle whose output agrees with Bob's output with probability at least ρ − δ.
As is the case in [IR] , our result can be shown to rule out the existence of black-box constructions of a key exchange protocol with super-quadratic security from a one-way function, though we omit the details. 4 To the best of our knowledge, no better bound than [IR] was previously known even in this case, where one does not assume the one-way function is a random oracle (hence making the task of proving a negative result easier). We note that similarly to previous black-box separation results, our adversary can be implemented efficiently in a relativized world where P = NP, meaning that we also rule out the somewhat larger family of relativizing reductions as well.
Correction of error:
A previous version of this manuscript [BMG] claimed a different proof of the same result. However, we have found a bug in that proof-see Appendix A. In fact the current proof is quite different from the one claimed in [BMG] . In [BMG] we also claimed an extension of Theorem 1.1 to the case of protocols with an oracle to a random permutation (i.e., a random one-to-one function R from {0, 1} * to {0, 1} * such that |R(x)| = |x| for every x ∈ {0, 1} * ). We do not know of an extension of the current proof to this model, beyond the observation of [IR] that any m-query attack in the random oracle model translates into an O(m 2 )-query attack in the random permutation model. Hence our results imply an O(n 4 )-query attack in the latter model, improving on the previousÕ(n 12 ) attack of [IR] .
We also note that shortly after we posted the manuscript [BMG] , Sotakova [Sot] posted an independently obtained weaker result, showing that protocols with only one round of interaction (each party sends one message) and non-adaptive queries can achieve at most O(n 2 ) security. In contrast, as in the work of [IR] , in this paper we allow protocols where the parties' choice of queries is adaptive and they can use an arbitrary polynomial number of interaction rounds. 5 The one-round case seems to be simpler, and in particular the bug found in our previous proof does not apply to that case.
Our techniques
It is instructive to compare our techniques with the techniques of the previous work by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR] . In order to do this, we review [IR] 's attack and outline of analysis, and particularly the subtle issue of dependence between Alice and Bob that arises in both works. The main novelty of our work is the way we deal with this issue, which is different than the approach of [IR] . We believe that this review of [IR] 's analysis and the way it compares to ours can serve as a useful introduction to our actual analysis. However, no result of this section is used in the later sections, and so the reader should feel free at any time to skip ahead to Sections 3 and 4 that contain our actual attack and its analysis.
Consider a protocol that consists of n rounds of interaction, where each party makes exactly one oracle query before sending its message. [IR] called protocols of this type "normal-form protocols" and gave añ O(n 3 ) attack against them (their final result was obtained by transforming every protocol into a normal-form protocol with a quadratic loss of efficiency). Although without loss of generality the attacker Eve of a key exchange protocol can defer all of her computation till after the interaction between Alice and Bob is finished, it is conceptually simpler in both [IR] 's case and ours to think of the attacker Eve as running concurrently with Alice and Bob. In particular, the attacker Eve of [IR] performed the following operations after each round i of the protocol:
• If the round i is one in which Bob sent a message, then at this point Eve samples 1000n log n random executions of Bob from the distributions of Bob's executions that are consistent with the information that Eve has at that moment (communication transcript and previous oracle answers). That is, Eve samples a uniformly random tape for Bob and uniformly random query answers subject to being consistent with Eve's information. After each time that she samples an execution, Eve asks the oracle all primitive Y to show T security. Since there is no meaningful notion of running time for black-box reduction, we believe the correct formalization is that the reduction works for every adversary that makes at most T queries to the primitive Y . Under this formalization, the above statement follows immediately from our results combined with the well-known fact that a random-oracle is a one-way function. 5 In fact, because we count only the number of oracle queries made by the honest parties, we can even allow a super-polynomial number of rounds.
the queries asked during this execution and records the answers. (Generally, the true answers will not be the same answers as the one Eve guessed when sampling the execution.)
• Similarly, if the round i is one in which Alice sent a message then Eve samples 1000n log n executions of Alice and makes the corresponding queries.
Overall Eve will sampleÕ(n 2 ) executions making a total ofÕ(n 3 ) queries. It's not hard to see that as long as Eve learns all of the intersection queries (queries asked by both Alice and Bob during the execution) then she can recover the shared secret with high probability (see also Theorem 5.1 below). Thus the bulk of [IR] 
The issue of independence
At first look, it may seem that one could easily prove (*). Indeed, (*) will follow by showing that at any round i, the probability that Eve fails in round i for the first time is at most 1/(10n). Now all the communication between Alice and Bob is observed by Eve, and if no failure has yet happened then Eve has also observed all the intersection queries so far. Because the answers for non-intersection queries are completely random and independent from one another it seems that Alice has no more information about Bob than Eve does, and hence if the probability that Alice's query q was asked before by Bob is more than 1/(10n) then this query q has probability at least 1/(10n) to appear in each one of Eve's sampled executions of Bob. Since Eve makes 1000n log n such samples, the probability that Eve misses q would be bounded by (1 − 1 10n ) 1000n log n ≪ 1/(10n). When trying to make this intuition into a proof, the assumption that Eve has as much information about Bob as Alice does translates to the following statement: conditioned on Eve's information, the distributions of Alice's view and Bob's view are independent from one another. 6 Indeed, if this statement was true then the above paragraph could be easily translated into a proof that [IR] 's attacker is successful, and it wouldn't have been hard to optimize this attacker to achieve O(n 2 ) queries. Alas, this statement is false. Intuitively the reason is the following: even the fact that Eve has not missed any intersection queries is some non-trivial information that Alice and Bob share and creates dependence between them. 7 Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR] dealt with this issue by a "charging argument", where they showed that the probability of such dependence can be charged in a certain way to one of the executions sampled by Eve, in a way that at most n samples can be charged at each round. The exact details are not crucial to the current work, though this is to some extent the heart of [IR] 's analysis and the cause of most of the technical complications there.
Our approach
We now describe our approach and how it differs from the previous proof of [IR] . The discussion below is somewhat high level and vague, and glosses over some important details. Again, the reader is welcome to skip ahead at any time to Section 3 that contains the full description of our attack, and does not depend on this section in any way.
Our attacking algorithm follows the same general outline, but has two important differences from the attacker of [IR] :
6 Readers familiar with the setting of communication complexity may note that this is analogous to the well known fact that conditioning on any transcript of a 2-party communication protocol results in a product distribution (i.e., combinatorial rectangle) over the inputs. However, things are different in the presence of a random oracle.
7 As a simple example consider a protocol where in the first round Alice chooses x to be either the string 0 n or 1 n at random, queries the oracle H at x and sends y = H(x) to Bob. Now Bob makes the query 1 n and gets y ′ = H(1 n ). Now even if Alice chose x = 0 n and hence Alice and Bob have no intersection queries, Bob can find out the value of x just by observing that y ′ = y.
1. One quantitative difference is that while our attacker Eve also computes a distribution D of possible executions of Alice and Bob conditioned on her knowledge, she does not sample from D full executions and then ask the arising queries. Rather, she computes whether there is any heavy query-a string q ∈ {0, 1} * that has probability more than, say, 1/(100n) of being queried in D-and makes only such heavy queries. Intuitively, since Alice and Bob make at most 2n queries, the total number of heavy queries (and hence the query complexity of Eve) is bounded by O(n 2 ). The actual analysis is more involved since the distribution D keeps changing as Eve learns more information through the messages she observes and query answers she receives. We omit the details in this high-level overview.
2. The qualitative difference between the two attackers is that we do not consider the same distribution D that was considered by [IR] . Their attacker to some extent "pretended" that the conditional distributions of Alice and Bob are independent from one another, and hence when trying to guess Bob's queries, only sampled consistent executions of Bob. In contrast, we define our distribution D to be the real distribution of Alice and Bob, where there could be dependencies between them. Thus to sample from our distribution D one would need to sample a pair of executions of Alice and Bob (random tapes and oracle answers) that are jointly consistent. Another (less important) point is that the distribution D computed by Eve at each point in time will be conditioned not only on Eve's knowledge so far, but also on the event that she has not failed until this point.
The main challenge in the analysis is to prove that the attack is successful, that is that the statement (*) above holds, and in particular that the probability of failure at each round (or more generally, at each query of Alice or Bob) is bounded by, say, 1/(10n). Once more, things would have been easy if we knew that the distribution D of the possible executions of Alice and Bob conditioned on Eve's knowledge (and not having failed so far) is a product distribution, and hence Alice has no more information on Bob than Eve has. While this is not generally true, we show that in our attack this distribution is close to being a product distribution, in a precise sense we define below.
At any point in the execution, fix Eve's current information about the system and define a bipartite graph G whose left-side vertices correspond to possible executions of Alice that are consistent with Eve's information and right-side vertices correspond to possible executions of Bob consistent with Eve's information. We put an edge between two executions A and B if they are consistent with one another and moreover if they do not represent an execution in which Eve failed prior to this point (i.e., there is no intersection query that is asked in both executions A and B but not by Eve). The distribution D that our attacker Eve considers can be thought of as choosing a random edge in the graph G. (Note that the graph G and the distribution D change at each point that Eve learns some new information about the system.) If G was the complete bipartite clique then D would be a product distribution. What we show is that G is dense in the sense that each vertex is connected to at least half the vertices on the other side. We show that this implies that Alice's probability of hitting a query that Bob asked before is at most twice the probability that Eve does so if she chooses the most likely query based on her knowledge.
The bound on the degree is obtained by showing that G can be represented as a disjointness graph, where each vertex u is associated with a set S(u) (from an arbitrarily large universe) and there is an edge between a left-side vertex u and a right-side vertex v if and only if S(u) ∩ S(v) = ∅. 8 We show that this particular graph has the property that |S(u)| ≤ n for all vertices u, and also the property that the distribution S(u) ∪ S(v) for a random edge {u, v} is light in the sense that there is no element q in the universe that has probability more than 1/(10n) of being contained in a set chosen from this distribution. We then show that these properties together imply that each vertex is connected to at least half of the vertices on the other side.
Comparison with [IR] . One can also phrase the analysis of [IR] in terms of a similar bipartite graph. Their argument involved fixing, say, Alice's execution which corresponds to fixing a left-side vertex u, they then showed that if the degree of u is high (e.g., u is connected to at least half of the right side) then their attacker is likely not to fail at this point. On the other hand, they showed that if the degree of u is low, then by taking a random vertex v on the right side and making all queries in the corresponding execution to v, one is likely to make progress in the sense that we learn a new query made in the execution corresponding to u. Now there are at most n new queries to learn, and hence if we sample 1000n log n executions, then in most of them we're in the high degree case. This potential/charging argument inherently requires sampling all queries of the execution, rather than only the heavy ones, hence incurring a cost of at least n 2 queries per round or n 3 queries total. It also seems hard to generalize this argument to protocols that are not in normal form, which is the reason their attacker for general protocols requiredΩ(n 6 ) queries.
Our attacker
A key exchange protocol Π involves Alice and Bob tossing coins r a and r b and then run a protocol having access to a random oracle H, that is a random function from {0, 1} ℓ to {0, 1} ℓ for some ℓ ∈ N. We assume that the protocol proceeds in some finite number of rounds, and no party asks the same query twice. In round k, if k is odd then Alice makes some number of queries and sends a message to Bob (and then Eve asks some oracle queries), and if k is even then Bob makes some queries and sends a message to Alice (and then Eve asks some oracle queries). At the end of the protocol Alice obtains an output string s a and Bob obtains an output string s b . We assume that there is some constant ρ > 0 such that Pr[s a = s b ] ≥ ρ, where the probability is over the coin tosses of Alice and Bob and the randomness of the oracle. We will establish Theorem 1.1 by proving that an attacker can make O(n 2 ) queries to learn s b with probability arbitrarily close to ρ.
In this section we describe an attack for Eve trying to find a set of size O(n 2 ) which contains all the queries asked by Alice and Bob in the random oracle model. This attack is analyzed in Section 4 to show that it is successful in finding all intersection queries and is efficient (i.e., will not ask more than O(n 2 ) many queries). Then this attack is used in Section 5 in order to find the actual secret.
Attacking algorithm
We start by showing that an attacker can find all the intersection queries (those asked by both Alice and Bob) with high probability. It turns out that this is the main step in showing that an attacker can find the secret with high probability (see Theorem 5.1 below). number of queries such that Eve's queries contain all the intersection queries of Alice and Bob with probability at least 1 − δ.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we need to show an attacking algorithm Eve that learns the intersection queries between Alice and Bob using at most O(n 2 ) queries. Letting ǫ = δ/100, our attack can be described in one sentence as follows:
As long as there exists a string q such that conditioned on Eve's current knowledge and assuming that no intersection query was missed so far, the probability that q was asked in the past (by either Alice or Bob) is at least ǫ/n, Eve makes the query q to the oracle.
To describe the attack more formally, we need to introduce some notation. We fix n to be the number of oracle queries asked by Alice and Bob and assume without loss of generality that all the queries are of length ℓ = ℓ(n) for some ℓ ∈ N. We will make the simplifying assumption that the protocol is in normal formthat is, at every round of the protocol Alice or Bob make exactly one query to the oracle (and hence there are 2n rounds). Later in Section 4.3 we will show how our analysis extends to protocols that are not of this form. Below and throughout the paper, we often identify a distribution D with a random variable distributed according to D.
Executions and the distribution EX EC. An execution of Alice, Bob, and Eve can be described by a tuple (r a , h a , r b , h b , I) where r a denotes Alice's random tape, h a denotes the sequence of answers that Alice gets in response to her oracle queries during the execution, r b and h b are defined analogously, and I denotes the set of all query/answer pairs that Eve learns during the execution. We say that a tuple (r a , h a , r b , h b , I ) is consistent if it describes an execution of Alice, Bob and Eve in which whenever two parties make the same query to the oracle they get the same answer. A partial execution is an execution truncated at a certain point in time (that is, the transcripts contain only the oracle answers for queries that are asked up to that point). We denote by EX EC the distribution over (full) executions that is obtained by running the algorithms for Alice, Bob and Eve with uniformly chosen random tapes and a random oracle.
The distribution EX EC(M, I
). For M = [m 1 , . . . , m i ] a sequence of i messages, and I a set of query/answer pairs, we denote by EX EC(M, I) the distribution over partial executions up to the point in the system in which the i th message is sent (by Alice or bob), where the transcript of messages equals M and the set of query/answers that Eve learns equals I. Note that we can verify that I is consistent with M by simulating Eve's algorithm on the transcript M , checking that whenever Eve makes a query, this query is in I, in which case we feed Eve with the corresponding answer (and verifying at the end that there are no "extra" queries in I not asked by Eve). Thus for every (M, I) that can be obtained from running the protocol, the distribution EX EC(M, I) is equal to the distribution obtained by sampling (r a , h a , r b , h b ) at random conditioned on being consistent with one another and (M, I).
The event Good(M, I) and the distribution GEX EC(M, I). The event Good(M, I) is defined as the event over EX EC(M, I
) that all the intersection queries asked by Alice and Bob during the partial execution are in I. More formally let Q(A) (resp. Q(B)) be the set of queries asked by Alice (resp. Bob) which are specified by the view of Alice (resp. Bob) consisting of her private randomness, oracle answers, and the messages received till the moment specified by (M, I). Therefore Good(M, I) is the same as Q(A) ∩ Q(B) ⊂ Q(I) where Q(I) is the set of queries of I (note that I is a set of query/answser pairs). We define the distribution GEX EC(M, I) to be the distribution EX EC(M, I) conditioned on Good(M, I).
Eve's algorithm. The attacker Eve's algorithm is specified as follows. It is parameterized by some constant ǫ > 0 which we assume is smaller than 1/10. At any point in the execution, if M is the sequence of messages Eve observed so far and I is the query/answer pairs she learned so far, Eve computes for every q ∈ {0, 1} ℓ the probability p q that q appears as a query in a random execution in GEX EC(M, I). If p q > ǫ/n then Eve asks q from the oracle and adds q and its answer to I. (If there is more than one such q then Eve asks the lexicographically first one.) Eve continues in this way until there is no additional query she can ask, at which point she waits until she gets new information (i.e., observes a new message sent between Alice and Bob).
Note that Eve's algorithm above may ask much more than n 2 queries. However, we will show that the probability that Eve asks more than n 2 /ǫ 2 queries is bounded by O(ǫ), and hence we can stop Eve after asking this many queries without changing significantly her success probability.
Remark 3.2. The attacking algorithm above is not computationally efficient, as in general computing the probability distribution GEX EC(M, I) could be a hard problem since it involves "inverting" the algorithms of Alice and Bob to a certain extent. But because computing these probabilities in #P, we can use known techniques (e.g., [BGP] ) to approximate them with arbitrarily good precision using an NP-oracle. In particular this means that our attacker (as was the case in previous works) is computationally efficient in a relativized world in which P = NP, and hence this result also rules out relativizing reductions from one-way functions to key exchange that achieve ω(n 2 ) security.
Analysis of attack: proof of Theorem 3.1
For i ∈ [2n], define the event Fail i to be the event that the query made at the i th round is an intersection query but is not contained in the set I of query/answer pairs known by Eve, and moreover that this is the first query satisfying this condition. Let the event Fail = i Fail i be the event that at some point an intersection query is missed by Eve, and let the event Long be that Eve makes more than n 2 /ǫ 2 queries. By setting ǫ = δ/100 and stopping Eve after n 2 /ǫ 2 queries, Theorem 3.1 immediately follows from the following two lemmas: 
Success of attack: proof of Lemma 4.1.
We now turn to proving Lemma 4.1. It will follow from the following stronger result: Proof outline of Lemma 4.3. Our approach to proving Lemma 4.3 is as follows:
That is, the probability that Fail i happens is at most 10ǫ/n conditioning on Eve's information equalling M, I, Bob's view of the execution equalling B and Good(M, I).

Proof of Lemma 4.1 from Lemma 4.3. Lemma 4.3 implies that in particular for every even
1. We start by observing that the Lemma would be easy if the distribution GEX EC(M, I) would have been a product distribution, with the views of Alice and Bob independent from one another. Roughly speaking this is because in this case Bob has no more information than Eve on the queries Alice made in the past, and hence also from Bob's point of view, no query is more probable than ǫ/n to have been asked by Alice.
2. Unfortunately this is not the case. However, we can show that the distribution GEX EC(M, I) is equal to the distribution obtained by taking some product distribution A × B and conditioning it on the event Good(M, I). (A similar observation was made by [IR] , see Lemma 6.5 there.)
Product characterization of GEX EC(M, I)
If M, I denote Eve's information just before the i th round, then we know that conditioned on M, I, no query has more than ǫ/n of being asked before by Alice, where this probability is taken over GEX EC(M, I 
Proof. We will show that for every pair of Alice/Bob executions (A, B) that satisfy the event Good(M, I), 
The denominator of the righthand side is only dependent on M and I. The numerator is equal to
The reason is that the necessary and sufficient condition for getting (A, B, M, I) in the system is that when we choose (r a , r b , H) to run the whole system we shall choose these specific random seeds r a , r b and we shall choose the answers specified in (A, B, I) to the queries in Q(A) ∪ Q(B) ∪ Q(I). The messages in M then will be generated by Alice and Bob correctly. Let α A = 2 −|ra| 2 −ℓ|Q(A)\Q(I)| and
) only depends on (M, I).
Graph characterization of GEX EC(M, I)
Fixing M, I that contain Eve's view up to just before the i th round, define a bipartite graph G = (V L , V R , E) as follows. Every node u ∈ V L will have a corresponding view A u of Alice that is in the support of the distribution A obtained from Lemma 4.4; we let the number of nodes corresponding to a view A be proportional to Pr A [A], meaning that A corresponds to the uniform distribution over the left-side vertices V L . Similarly, every node v ∈ V R will have a corresponding view of Bob B v such that B corresponds to the uniform distribution over V R . We define Q u = Q(A u ) \ Q(I) for u ∈ V L to be the set of queries outside of I that were asked by Alice in the view A u , and define Q v = Q(B u ) \ Q(I) similarly. We put an edge in the graph between u and v (denoted by u ∼ v) if and only if Q u ∩ Q v = ∅. Lemma 4.4 implies that the distribution GEX EC(M, I) is equal to the distribution obtained by letting (u, v) be a random edge of the graph G and choosing (A u , B v ).
Note that because we assumed Pr EX EC(M,I) [Good(M, I) ] > 0 this graph is nonempty. It turns out that this graph is dense:
is the degree of the vertex w.
Proof. We first show that for every w ∈ V L , v∈V R ,w ∼v d(v) ≤ ǫ|E|. The reason is that the probability of vertex v being chosen when we choose a random edge is
Hence because |Q w | ≤ n, by the pigeonhole principle there exists a ∈ Q w such that Pr (u,v) ← R E [a ∈ Q v ] ≥ ǫ/n. But this is a contradiction, because then a should be in I by the definition of the attack and cannot be in Q w . The same argument shows that for every w ∈ V R , u∈V L ,u ∼w d(u) ≤ ǫ|E|. So we proved that for any vertex w we have |E ∼ (w) = {(u, v) ∈ E | u ∼ w ∧ w ∼ v}| ≤ ǫ|E|, and d(w) > 0 for every w ∈ V L ∪ V R . Now the following claim proves the lemma.
By switching the left and right sides if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that (*):
, and therefore
which is a contradiction for ǫ < 1/2.
Proving Lemma 4.3
Now we can prove Lemma 4.3. Let B, M, I be as in Lemma 4.3 and q be Bob's query which is fixed now. By Lemma 4.4, the distribution GEX EC(M, I) conditioned on getting B as Bob's view is the same as (A × B) conditioned on Good(M, I) ∧ (B = B). By the definition of the bipartite graph G = (V L , V R , E) it is the same as choosing a random edge (u, v) ← R E conditioned on B v = B and choosing (A u , B v ). We prove Lemma 4.3 even conditioned on fixing v such that B v = B. Now the distribution on Alice's view is the same as choosing u ← R N (v) to be a random neighbor of v and choosing A u . Let S = {u ∈ V L | q ∈ A u }. Then we have:
The second and fourth inequalities are because of Lemma 4.5. The third one is because |E| ≤ |V L ||V R |. The fifth one is because of the definition of the attack which asks ǫ/n heavy queries, and the sixth one is because ǫ < 1/3.
Efficiency of attack: proof of Lemma 4.2
We call an event E defined over partial executions of EX EC lasting if whenever E holds for a partial execution, it holds for all extensions of it (i.e., partial executions that we get by continuing the experiment). For example the events Fail and Long are both lasting. For a lasting event E, let EX EC(E), be the same experiment as EX EC with the difference that we stop the execution as soon as E happens. Note that we have
Proof outline of Lemma 4.2. The proof proceeds by the following two steps:
• If at any point during a partial execution of EX EC, we get Pr EX EC (M,I) • In the experiment EX EC(Bad) whenever Eve asks a query q which is ǫ/n heavy for the distribution GEX EC(M, I), it is also γ = [Bad] ≤ 44ǫ .
4.2.1
Step 1: Bounding Pr EX EC [Bad] Note that ¬Good(M, I) implies that Fail i has already happened for some i, and so ¬Good(M, I) implies Fail.
The following lemma is implied by Lemma 6.4 in [IR] , but we give a proof here for sake of completeness.
Proof. Let's assume Pr EX EC [Bad] > 40ǫ, and we will prove Pr EX EC [Fail] > 20ǫ which is a contradiction. When we run the system and the attack, instead of choosing the whole randomness (for Alice, Bob, and the oracle) at the beginning, we can choose some parts of the system first (according to their distribution in the original experiment), and then choose the rest of it from their distribution conditioned on the known parts. The lazy evaluation of the oracle answers is a special case of this general method. Therefore we can do as follows:
1. Run the system till an arbitrary point to get (M, I) as Eve's information about the system. We pretend that till this point, we have just sampled (M, I), and the rest of the system's description is not chosen yet.
2. Choose the "true" view of Alice and Bob till this point from their distribution EX EC(M, I).
3. Continue running the system conditioned on the views of Alice, Bob, and Eve so far.
The moment that we sample Alice and Bob's views in the second step of the mentioned method is arbitrary, and we can choose this point to be the moment that Bad happens (if it happens at all). In other words we run the game till the moment that Bad happens: Pr EX EC (M,I) [¬Good(M, I)] > 1/2, and then will choose Alice and Bob's computation so far, and then continue the game. But if Bad never happens we sample Alice and Bob's computation just at the end.
Since ¬Good(M, I) ⊂ Fail when Pr EX EC (M,I) [¬Good(M, I)] > 1/2 happens for the first time in our execution of the system and we choose Alice and Bob's previous computation, Fail will hold for this running of the system with probability at least 1/2. So, if Pr EX EC [Bad] > 40ǫ, then with probability at least (40ǫ) 1 2 = 20ǫ the event Fail holds in the system which is not possible. 
Define the random variable Y j to be 1 if the j th query Eve makes was asked before by Alice or Bob. Clearly j Y j ≤ 2n since Alice and Bob each make at most n queries, and hence
Claim: Let p j be the probability that Eve asks the j th query. Then
Note that j p j is the expected number of queries asked by Eve, and the claim implies that
γ , hence proving the lemma. Proof of Claim: Define Y q j to be 1 if the j th query that Eve asks is q and q was asked before by Alice or Bob. Then,
Let O j be a random variable that whenever there is a j th query asked by Eve, it denotes the information (i.e., transcript and query/answer pairs) that Eve has up to the point when it makes its j th query. In an execution where Eve makes less than j queries, we define O j = ⊥. Note that the j th query of Eve is determined by O j which we denote by q(O j ) (and we define q(⊥) = ⊥). Let W j = SU P P (O j ) \ {⊥}, and so we will have:
Pr[Eve queries some q as its j
Removing the normal form assumption
In this section we show how to get an attack of the same O(n 2 /δ 2 ) complexity finding all the intersection queries of Alice and Bob for a more general form of protocols. The proof has the following two steps:
1. We extend the result with the same complexity of O(n 2 /δ 2 ) queries for the attack to the "seminormal" protocols by a bit more careful analysis of the same attack given above. A seminormal protocol is a protocol in which Alice and Bob can ask either zero or one query in each of their rounds. Again Alice and Bob ask at most n queries each, but the number of rounds R can be arbitrary larger than n.
2. Any protocol can be changed into a seminormal protocol without increasing n or loosing the security. Suppose i is a round in the original protocol in which Bob is going to ask k ≤ n number of queries (k is not known to Eve or Alice) and then send the message m i to Alice. In the new protocol, this round will be divided into 2n − 1 sub-rounds. In the j th sub-round (of this round) if j is even, Alice will just send the message ⊥ to Bob. So let j is an odd number. If j ≤ k, Bob will ask his j th query which he was going to ask in the i th round of the original protocol, and if j > k he asks no query. If j < 2n − 1, Bob sends also the message ⊥ to Alice in the sub-round j, and if j = 2n − 1 he sends his message m i to Alice. It is clear that this artificial change only increases the number of rounds and will not give Eve any extra information, and therefore it is as secure as the original protocol. In the actual attack, Eve will pretend that Alice and Bob are sending the extra ⊥ messages to each other in the sub-rounds and will attack the protocol in the seminormal form, and as we will prove she finds all the intersection queries with probability 1 − δ using O(
δ 2 ) number of queries.
Attack for seminormal protocols. Now we assume that Alice and Bob run a seminormal protocol in which each of them asks at most n number of oracle queries. We prove that the same attack of Section 3 finds all the intersection queries with probability 1− δ using O( n 2 δ 2 number of queries. We only show that the attack is successful in finding all the intersection queries and the same argument as before shows that the efficiency follows from the success property. Let BFail i be the event that Bob's i th query is the first intersection query out of I, and similarly let AFail i be the event that Alice's i th query is the first intersection query out of I. 
Finding the secret
Now, we turn to the question of finding the secret. Theorem 6.2 in [IR] shows that once one finds all the intersection queries, with O(n 2 ) more queries they can also find the actual secret. Here we use the properties of our attack to show that we can do so even without asking more queries.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that the total number of queries asked by Alice and Bob is at most n each, and their outputs agree with probability at least ρ having access to a random oracle. Then there is an adversary Eve asking at most O( n 2 δ 2 ) number of queries such that Eve's output agrees with Bob's output with probability at least ρ − δ.
Proof. Let assume that in the last round of the protocol Alice sends a special message LAST to Bob. In order to find the secret Eve runs the attack of Section 3.1 10 and at the end (when Alice has sent LAST and Eve has asked her queries from the oracle), Eve samples (A, B) ← R GEX EC(M, I) (where (M, I) is Eve's information at the moment) and outputs the secret s(A) determined by Alice's view A. Now we prove that her secret agrees with Bob's secret with probability ρ − O(ǫ) and the theorem follows by setting δ = cǫ for sufficiently small constant c.
Let the random variables A, B, E be in order the view of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the game. LetĀ be the random variable generated by Sampling (A, B) ← R GEX EC(M, I) where M, I are
• The distribution of A in (A, B, E) | Good(A, B, E) is the same as choosing v ∈ V R such that B v = B (because all the vertices {v | B v = B} have the same set of neighbors) and then choosing a random neighbor of it u ← R N (v) and getting A u .
• The distribution ofĀ in (Ā, B, E) | Good(Ā, B, E) is the same as choosing v ∈ V R such that B v = B (because all of the vertices {v | B v = B} have the same set of neighbors) and then choosing a random edge (u, v ′ ) ← R D conditioned on u ∼ v and then getting A u . The last step (of choosing u) is the same as choosing u ∈ N (v) with probabilities proportional to their degrees.
We show that the two above distributions have statistical distance at most 2ǫ even for a fixed v such that B v = B. The first distribution chooses u ∈ N (v) uniformly at random, but the second distribution chooses u ∈ N (v) with probabilities proportional to their degrees. But since for every u ∈ V L , (1 − 2ǫ)|V R | ≤ d(u) ≤ |V R |, (and ǫ < 1/4) one can easily show that the statistical distance is bounded by 2ǫ.
Therefore, when we want to know the distribution of Alice in Imag conditioned on (M, I), if q is asked in Alice's view A and also we have q ∈ I, then A is less probable in the case Bob has asked q before Eve compared to the case that it is asked after Eve.
